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INTRODUCTION
The modern process of electing state judges is often characterized
by hostile campaigns, influential "big money" contributions, and an un-
informed voting public.' In these respects, judicial campaigns resemble
partisan political campaigns. However, campaign tactics that are typi-
cally associated with political elections are inconsistent with notions of
t B.A., Cornell University, 2001; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2004. The
author thanks Professor W. Bradley Wendel, Washington & Lee University School of Law, for
his invaluable comments and suggestions.
I See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO AcTON: STATEMENT
OF THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION (2001) available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/WC/publications/ResJudSelCallToActionPub.pdf [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL SUMMIT]. "Eighty-seven percent of state appellate and trial judges are selected through
direct or retention election." Id.
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judicial impartiality and independence. 2 Given the unique tenor of the
judicial branch of government, a non-political branch, state legislatures
must be able to regulate judicial elections, or to use other means to make
them more meaningful. Over the past few years, a national movement
dedicated to affording state legislators this very power has made strong
preliminary advances in bringing about reform to the judicial election
system, and continues to combat the ills of excessive campaign financ-
ing, inappropriate mudslinging, special interest group endorsement of
candidates, and other types of campaign foul play. This movement, how-
ever, suffered a setback in June of 2002, when the Supreme Court ruled
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White that the "announce clause" of
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct-enacted by the state's legisla-
ture in 1974 to prohibit judicial candidates from announcing their views
on disputed legal or political issues-violated the First Amendment. 3
The Court found that the clause unconstitutionally restricted candidate
speech, despite the inherent differences between judicial and political
elections, as well as the state's interest in providing judges with freedom
from public pressure to commit to particular positions.
White sets a dangerous precedent. The decision threatens the future
of judicial election reform, not only casting doubt upon the force of other
state provisions aimed at restricting the speech of judicial candidates, but
also calling into question the authority of state legislators to monitor or
improve judicial elections in other ways. The reality is, however, that
White is solely a decision on the construction of one provision particular
to eight state statutes, and speaks sparingly to the constitutionality of
other state ethics provisions. Although Minnesota's attempt to maintain
a broad-based limitation on judicial candidates' speech was unsuccessful,
more moderate state provisions stand a greater chance of surviving Su-
preme Court scrutiny. Instead of embracing White, there is a real pros-
pect that state legislatures and courts will find ways to limit its scope in
the interest of restoring fairness and independence to the judiciary. Tak-
ing steps to restrict White's impact would help to protect the function of
the judiciary by "de-politicizing" judicial elections, encouraging public
confidence in judges, and providing for continued judicial election re-
form. This note will not enter the long-standing debate weighing the mer-
its of appointing judges against the merits of electing judges, but rather
begins on the premise that the election of judges remains an appropriate
means of judicial selection. 4 White does not represent the beginning of
2 See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, I I CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 277 (2002).
3 536 U.S. 765 (2002), rev'g Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cit.
2001).
4 Affording people the power to elect state judges fosters democratic accountability.
For an argument promoting the adoption of an appointive judicial selection system for state
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the end for judicial election reform, but instead represents a call for care-
ful and limited reform.
Part I of this note contends that impartiality is the foundation of a
fair and accountable judiciary-a principle which is confirmed by the
ethics canons of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, upon which most
states base their ethics codes. 5 Part II identifies present hindrances to the
meaningful election of judges, illuminating the disparity between recent
candidate conduct and the appropriate candidate behavior the Model
Code envisions. Part III recounts the impressive actions various organi-
zations have taken to encourage the decent and principled election of
judges, and examines the renewed interest within the legal community
regarding the role existing state ethics provisions can play in enforcing
ideal candidate speech and behavior. Part IV discusses the Supreme
Court's decision striking the announce clause from Minnesota's Code of
Judicial Conduct in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. Part V ar-
gues that the Court's decision diluted the important distinctions between
judicial elections and political elections, weakened the force of state eth-
ics canons, and paid only moderate attention to the relevant constitu-
tional exertions of state authority in the past over judicial elections. Part
VI measures the reach of White, concluding that, although the decision to
some extent frustrates judicial election reform, its effect is limited be-
cause only eight other states had an announce clause similar to Minne-
sota's announce clause at the time of the ruling, and because the clause
was broader than the majority of state ethics provisions addressing candi-
date speech. Part VII characterizes the confusion that has resulted
among the states in the aftermath of White, with particular reference to
the post-White decisions of Weaver v. Bonner,6 In re Kinsey,7 and
Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.8 Part VIII
examines the responses of various organizations to the White decision,
characterized by a heightened commitment to restoring the integrity of
judicial elections.
court judges, see Behrens and Silverman, supra note 2. "'The restraint, temperament and
detachment that we rightly demand from our judges is fundamentally incongruous with parti-
san, statewide political campaigns.'" Id. at 277-78 (quoting Tom Ridge, Director of the
United States Office of Homeland Security).
5 See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
6 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002).
7 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003).
8 244 F.Supp.2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
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I. IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY
"States have a compelling interest in courts that are, and appear to
be, fair and impartial, regardless of the method of judicial selection." 9 At
the most basic level, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment compels judicial impartiality.' 0 A judge must protect an individ-
ual's constitutional right to an impartial tribunal by interpreting the law
from a neutral standpoint, unencumbered by any personal stake he may
have in the outcome of the trial." In carrying out this "constitutional
mandate," a judge must resist any surrounding political pressures, and
any other "'direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion.' "12 On this basis, a judge's duties are wholly distinguishable
from those of any politician who, as a matter of normal course, formu-
lates opinions associated with controversial issues on the basis of her
own leanings or the leanings of others to whom she is partial. 13 Indeed,
unlike other elected officials, judges are required to act without bias or
the influence of others to ensure the "'proper and fair administration of
justice.' "14
Lifetime appointments and tenured judgeships speak to the value of
a judiciary that is impervious to the political pressures of the changing
times-a judge can better fulfill his purpose if he does not "fear ... [his]
livelihood will be impacted solely for making a decision that is right
legally and factually but unpopular politically."' 15 In addition, it is vital
to understand that "[t]he state's interest in guaranteeing due process in-
cludes eliminating not only actual bias but also the appearance of bias." 16
Because the public relies on the judiciary to interpret and apply the law,
it is important for judges to "demonstrate the ability to rise above the
political moment to enforce the rule of law."'
17
9 Brief in Support of Respondents for Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
School of Law et al. at 4, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-
521) [hereinafter Brennan Center Brief].
1o Id. at 5.
1 Id.
12 Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
13 See id. at 9.
14 Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Indepen-
dence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 378 (2002) (quoting OFFICIAL VOTERS' PAMPHLET, PRI-
MARY ELECTION 16 (1950)).
15 Id. at 389.
16 Brennan Center Brief, supra note 9, at 6.
17 De Muniz, supra note 14, at 389; David Hudson, Can States Ban Judicial Candidates
From Speaking on Legal or Political Issues?, 6 PREVIEW OF THE UNITES STATES SUPREME
COURT CASES 331, 334 (2002) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist, stating "a judicial nominee
should not 'express any but the most general observation about the law' because otherwise it
might appear that the nominee was announcing views on particular subjects to 'obtain
favorable consideration' ").
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Beyond the necessity of judicial neutrality in affording individuals
due process under the law, the principle of separation of powers-the
very foundation of American government-envisions a judiciary that is
substantially independent from the legislative and executive branches of
government.' 8 The independent operation of the courts provides for an
adequate check on the other branches of government, thus upholding the
separation of powers scheme. Therefore, whefi politics begin to change
the basic fiber of the judiciary, the courts can no longer provide as sub-
stantial a check on the other, more political branches of government.
The neutrality of the courts, as shaped by the Constitution and sepa-
ration of powers theory, is only confirmed by certain judicial ethics ca-
nons, often codified in state statutes. The Model Code of Judicial
Conduct defines appropriate judicial conduct according to standards
agreed upon by the American Bar Association (ABA). ' 9 While not bind-
ing upon the states, most states have adopted standards of judicial con-
duct that closely resemble the Model Code. 20
At its 1921 convention, the ABA appointed a committee to formu-
late standards of judicial ethics. 2' The committee ultimately created the
1924 canons, comprised of thirty-six rules of judicial conduct.22 The
ABA appointed a committee to revise and improve the original canons in
1969, and adopted the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which
consisted of seven canons, in 1972.23 The ABA subsequently condensed
the seven canons into five and adopted the modern version of the Model
Code in 1990.24
The canons of the Model Code can be summarized fairly succinctly.
In short, Canon One requires judges to "uphold the integrity and inde-
pendence of the judiciary. '' 25 Under Canon Two, judges must "avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of [their] activi-
ties."' 26 Judges must also "perform the duties of judicial office impar-
tially and diligently," according to Canon Three. 27 Canon Four requires
judges to "so conduct [their] extra-judicial activities as to minimize the
risk of conflict with judicial obligations. ' 28 In this respect, Canon Four
instructs judges, at a minimum, to "refrain from casting reasonable doubt
18 Id. at 373.
19 See MODEL CODE, supra note 5.
20 Stephanie Cotilla & Amanda Suzanne Veal, Note, Judicial Balancing Act: The Ap-
pearance of Inpartiality and the First Amendment, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 742 (2002).
21 Id. at 741.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 742.
24 Id.; MODEL CODE, supra note 5.
25 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 1.
26 Id. Canon 2.
27 Id. Canon 3.
28 Id. Canon 4.
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on their capacity to act impartially as [judges]" in conducting extra-judi-
cial activities. 29 Finally, Canon Five directs judges to "refrain from inap-
propriate political activity. '30 Clearly, these canons, at a very basic
level, are based on notions of judicial impartiality and integrity, which is
free from external political forces.
In particular, Canon Five imposes specific restrictions on the activi-
ties of judicial candidates as a means of guarding against "inappropriate
political activity" associated with the judiciary.3' A judicial candidate
may inform voters of his or her qualifications for judicial office. How-
ever, under Canon 5A(3)(d), a candidate for judicial office may not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court; or
(iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications,
present position or other fact concerning the candi-
date or an opponent.32
Thus, judicial candidates may not make campaign promises or even
committal statements with respect to issues that are likely to come before
the court, nor may a candidate lie about an opponent. In addition, Model
Code Canon 5C(2) prohibits candidates from committing financially to
particular causes by "personally solicit[ing] or accept[ing] campaign con-
tributions or personally solicit[ing] publicly stated support."' 33 Although
a candidate may not do so personally, he or she may (according to the
Model Code) instead establish "committees of responsible persons to
conduct campaigns" and "solicit and accept reasonable campaign contri-
butions ... and public support. '34
Most states have adopted canons, some closely resembling the
ABA's standards, imposing ethical obligations upon judges by which or-
dinary candidates for political office do not have to abide. In fact, politi-
cal campaigns are often marked by the very tactics the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct sets out to forbid-campaign promises, aggressive can-
didate stances on controversial issues, heavy commitment to interest
group positions, and advertisements of questionable accuracy accusing
opposing candidates of objectionable conduct-further illustrating the
29 Cotilla & Veal, supra note 20, at 745.
30 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 5.
31 Id.
32 Id. Canon 5A(3)(d) (emphasis added).
33 Id. Canon 5C(2).
34 Id.
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fact that judicial elections are inherently different from political elec-
tions. These types of behavior, while perhaps unbecoming of political
candidates, are expressly forbidden among judicial candidates in certain
states. 35 In recent years, however, "judicial candidates... seem increas-
ingly willing to transgress judicial conduct rules, relying on First
Amendment protections, to criticize court rulings or opponents and to
either imply or explicitly state how they would rule in cases raising hot
button issues in order to gain campaign support.
' 36
II. BREAKDOWN OF ETHICS: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
IN DECLINE
Judges in forty-two states stand for partisan, nonpartisan, or reten-
tion elections at some point during their judicial careers. 37 In recent
years, the "dramatic rise of inappropriate conduct" associated 'With judi-
cial election campaigns and the increasingly antagonistic nature of these
campaigns 38 have undermined judicial ethics canons and have raised
questions as to the efficacy of elections as a mode of judicial selection.39
Even steadfast supporters of judicial elections have expressed "growing
concern that judicial campaign races are turning into traditional mud-
slinging wars of the sort associated with the campaigns for the other two
branches of government, '40 and with good reason. Local party influence
over nominations, exorbitant campaign financing, special interest group
endorsements, and hostile mudslinging, have subverted the judicial elec-
tion process in recent years and threatened established standards of judi-
cial campaign ethics. Admittedly, some element of politics inevitably
enters into the judicial election process, in both partisan and non-partisan
elections. 4' The increased prevalence of such political trends in judicial
35 See, e.g., ALASKA CODE JUD. CONDUCT; ARIZ. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; GA. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT; ILL. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; IND. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; KAN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT;
Ky. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; LA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; NEV. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; N.Y. CODE
JUD. CONDUCT; N.D. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; OIo CODE JUD. CONDUCT; OKLA. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT; R.I. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; S.C. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; S.D. CODE JUD. CONDUCT;
TENN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; VT. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; WASH. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; W. VA.
CODE JUD. CONDUCT; Wyo. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
36 De Muniz, supra note 14, at 389.
37 American Bar Association, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Law-
yers' Political Contributions: Part H1, at 7 (1998).
38 Jonathan Lippman, Electing Judges Should Be More Dignified, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22,
2002, at SBI.
39 See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 2, at 275-76.
40 Hudson, supra note 17, at 333.
41 See W. Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial
Election Campaigns, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 108 (2001).
Even though courts frequently allude to the ideal of neutrality in judging, they never-
theless must grudgingly admit that judges are humans, not machines, and that judges
decide cases at least in part on the basis of political presuppositions. The question
thus becomes how to draw a line between good and bad, high and low, or unbiased
20031
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elections of late, however, demonstrates the importance of the role ethi-
cal standards can play in keeping judicial elections under control. 42
A. LOCAL PARTY CONTROL
In local partisan judicial elections, each political party nominates an
individual to run as a candidate for judicial office. When one party over-
whelmingly dominates an area, however, that party's nominee is practi-
cally ensured victory, due to the fact that voters tend to vote along party
lines. 43 In this regard, powerful local parties and party leaders can, for
all intents and purposes, select individuals to sit on the bench. This type
of local party influence distorts judicial elections: (1) because the vote is
effectively taken from the public's hands; and (2) because the selection
of judges is heavily guided by politics.
Over the past few years, numerous newspaper editorials have
openly attacked judicial elections across New York State, particularly
with respect to the powerful influence of local political party organiza-
tions over the judicial selection process. 44 In her editorial column, which
appeared in the New York Times, Dorothy Samuels claimed that "the
dominant political clubhouses in each borough [of New York] ... exer-
cise major control over [judicial nominations] '4 5 so that the "nomination
of a candidate ... is often tantamount to election. '46 Thus, "[u]nder the
guise of elections ... judges [in New York] are effectively appointed by
or biased, political beliefs, so that we can get a sense for what kinds of restrictions
on speech are permissible.
Id.
42 In attempting to limit the influence of local party control, campaign contributions and
"noisy" campaigns, one could argue that partisan elections should be abandoned and only non-
partisan elections should be held, so as to force voters to focus upon the qualifications of the
candidates, as opposed to party concerns, while still preserving notions of democratic account-
ability. One could also argue that ethics standards are actually unconstitutional in the setting
of partisan elections-and that ethics standards can only be applied legally in non-partisan
elections. The distinction between partisan and nonpartisan elections, however, is of little
significance, given that politics appear to play some part in all types of elections.
43 While voters in elections exhibit a tendency to vote according to party, commentators
contend that voters in local judicial elections in particular vote along party lines because they
are either uninformed or uninterested in such election outcomes. See Behrens & Silverman,
supra note 2, at 291, 294.
44 See Editorial, New York's Farcical Judicial Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at
A16; Editorial, Politics as Usual; Judicial Nominations Turn on a Power Struggle Unrelated
to the Courts, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 26, 2003, at CIO; Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, New York's
Long and Sorry Tradition of Judicial Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A34; Editorial,
That Time of Year Again, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 16, 2003, at 36. See also Background
Paper on Judicial Elections in New York State, Prepared for the National Summit on Judicial
Elections, at 4 (Dec. 8-9, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Background] (noting that
"[s]ingle party dominance in some areas gives local political organizations and local party
leaders a great deal of influence over the judicial selection process).
45 Samuels, supra note 44.
46 Background, supra note 44, at 4.
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Democratic Party leaders, who get to assign their favorites a spot on the
Democratic Party line. ' '47 Samuels characterized this reality as an "un-
healthy nexus between the clubhouse and the courthouse created by the
state's system of electing judges."'48 The Republican Party's nominees
hold a similar advantage in other counties in New York State.49 In fact,
"throughout much of [the state,] ... local political parties play an influ-
ential role in determining who appears on the ballot and who gets elected
to the bench."'50 Strong local party influence is by no means unique to
New York State. Rather, what has occurred in that state is representative
of what is happening in numerous other partisan judicial elections nation-
wide. Indeed, party control can expand the presence of politics within
the context of judicial elections.
B. EXCESSIVE SPENDING
1. Campaign Contributions
The escalation of campaign spending has also contributed to the
politicization of judicial elections. 5' Candidate fundraising was three
times higher in 2000 than it was in 1990.52 The total funds judicial can-
didates raised in 1998 and 2000 alone exceeded the combined funds
raised in elections from 1990 to 1996, 53 and this recent rise in candidate
fundraising has created a standard that incumbent judges now feel pres-
sured to meet.54
Even though private contributions to judges do not technically vio-
late Canon Five of the Model Code, excessive contributions undermine
at least the "appearance of neutrality. '55 Contributions provide incen-
tives for judicial candidates to violate their obligation to remain neutral,
inducing them to take popular positions. "This is exactly the sort of in-
47 Samuels, supra note 44. Samuels refers to New York's judicial elections as "sham
elections." Id.
48 Id. In using the term "unhealthy nexus," Samuels was actually referring to the condi-
tion of New York's judicial election system in 1872, but she noted that "little has changed"
since then. Id.
49 Background, supra note 44, at 4.
50 Id.
51 Brennan Center Brief, supra note 9, at 15.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 16. "[E]lected judges cannot ignore the vital role of fund-raising in attaining
and retaining judicial office." Id.
55 See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 5C(2) cmt. The commentary to Canon 5C(2)
states that the Model Code "permits a candidate, other than a candidate for appointment, to
establish campaign committees to solicit and accept public support and reasonable financial
contributions." Id. However, the commentary also indicates that "[t]hough not prohibited,
campaign contributions of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who
appear before the judge, may be relevant to 'disqualification under Section 3E." id.
2003]
146 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:137
centive toward particular positions that has no place in the judiciary. 56
This is significant because "the public expects justice to be 'blind,' and
not influenced by campaign contributions. '57 For it to appear otherwise
discourages public confidence in, and respect for, the judiciary. Moreo-
ver, "there is at least some empirical evidence" indicating that campaign
contributions do influence judicial elections. 58
2. Special Interest Group Endorsements
The increased participation of special interest groups in judicial
campaigns over the past few years has only exacerbated the problem of
over-spending in judicial elections. Campaigns in the year 2000 "fea-
tured an unprecedented infusion of big money, special interest pressure
and television advertising." 59 In 2002, the Justice at Stake Campaign, an
organization dedicated to maintaining fair and impartial courts, reported
that special interest groups funded every attack ad and "82% of the 'con-
trast' ads praising one candidate and criticizing another" in the early
stages of judicial campaigns nationwide. 60 The fact is that candidates
typically cannot afford to buy television ads themselves, particularly in
the early stages of a campaign. 61 Thus, when a special interest group
supports a candidate financially, the candidate becomes, to some extent,
dependent upon that interest group's money, creating a tension that is
inappropriate in the context of judicial elections. 62 In other words, inter-
est group endorsements create incentives for candidates, if elected, to
cater to the causes of the interest groups that supported their campaign.
One could argue that a qualified judge could resist the outside political
forces that may have driven his election to office. However, even if a
judge does not further the goals of his financial backers, the mere influx
of money and television ads associated with judicial campaigns, taken as
a whole, diminishes the appearance of impartiality in the judiciary.63 Re-
gardless, examination of the 2002 campaigns has in fact revealed some
correlation between television advertising support and the outcome of
elections in some states. 64 Voters should select judges based on their
qualifications within a non-political sphere, yet "expensive television at-
56 Id. at 19.
57 Behrens & Silverman, supra note 2, at 280-81 (citing 2001 Texans for Public Justice
study suggesting a correlation between lawyer contributions and judicial decisionmaking).
58 Id. at 279-80.
59 Campaign 2002: The National Trends, EYES ON JUSTICE: THE JUSTICE AT STAKE
NEWSLETTER, Oct. 24, 2002 [hereinafter Campaign 2002].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Behrens & Silverman, supra note 2, at 280-81.
63 Id. at 281.
64 Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, State Supreme Court Races: Ten Out of
Eleven Candidates With the Most TV Advertising Support Also Received the Most Votes (Nov.
THE END OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORM?
tack ads run by interest groups in judicial elections heighten concerns
that justice is for sale." 65
C. MUDSLINGING AND Noisy CAMPAIGNS
Perhaps the most blatant trend infiltrating judicial elections in recent
years is the increasingly hostile nature of campaigns-"judicial elections
. .. [are] 'noisier [and] nastier.'"66 The Conference of Chief Judges
submitted an amicus brief in White, warning of the need to account for
the "political realities" of modem judicial campaigns. 67 These political
realities include lying, mud-slinging, and other disreputable campaign
tactics. Though such tactics have pervaded political elections for many
years, judicial campaigns historically have taken a less combative tone,
principally because of the obligations associated with judicial office. 68
Thus, judicial elections "have come increasingly to resemble legislative
and executive contests in cost, intensity and style."'69 In this regard,
judges have displayed a growing willingness to involve themselves in
embittered exchanges with their opponents and publicly address contro-
versial issues likely to come before the court. In fact, public censure and
admonishment of sitting judges for taking positions on issues while
campaigning has increased. 70 Furthermore, recent judicial elections have
received much media attention, centering not upon the qualifications of
candidates, but rather examining the inappropriate or hostile nature of
certain candidates' campaigns.
In the context of judicial elections, "[a]ll this makes judges appear
like ordinary politicians to many voters."'7' The judiciary, however, de-
serves special protection from political tactics, because the effectiveness
of the judicial branch is uniquely hinged upon impartiality and public
trust. 72 Historically, states have had the authority to place restrictions on
judicial elections to protect against just such political forces and should
be able to continue to do so. In this respect, ethics canons prohibiting
20, 2002), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2002/
pressrelease 2002 1120.html.
65 Brennan Center Brief, supra note 9, at 16.
66 Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief Justices at 26, Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-402 1) [hereinafter Chief Justices' Brief]
(quoting ABA Task Force Report, citing Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?: The
State's Top Judge Resigns to Fight for Reform, TIME, Jan. II, 1988, at 74).
67 Id.
68 See NATIONAL SUMMIT, supra note 1.
69 Chief Justices' Brief, supra note 66, at 26 (citing ABA Task Force Report). Before
White reached the United States Supreme Court, the case was called, Republican Party of
Minnesota v. Kelly [hereinafter Kelly].
70 See Lippman, supra note 38.
71 NATIONAL SUMMIT, supra note 1.
72 Id.
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certain behavior by judicial candidates-the same behavior which is per-
missible (albeit reprehensible) for ordinary politicians-should be both
preserved and strengthened.
III. A CALL TO ACTION
The deterioration of principled judicial elections has drawn the at-
tention of many organizations, such as the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC).73 In December 2000, the NCSC sponsored a summit in
Chicago to discuss the potential for reform of the judicial selection pro-
cess.74 Ninety-five judicial, legislative, and other leaders and representa-
tives from national organizations in favor of judicial election reform
attended.75 At the summit, attendees discussed possible efforts to imple-
ment campaign finance reform, increase voter awareness and participa-
tion in judicial elections, monitor judicial election campaign conduct,
and improve partisan elections. 76 The Summit attendees were also con-
cerned with protecting the free speech of judicial candidates, while pro-
moting fair elections. 77 This conference resulted in a "call to action,"
which spelled out a number of recommendations for judicial election re-
form.78 Some of these recommendations included implementing educa-
tional programs on state elections laws complemented by sanctions for
violations of state election laws, establishing "hotlines" run by judicial
disciplinary bodies to respond to inquiries about campaign conduct, sup-
porting non-governmental monitoring groups that would encourage fair
campaigns by offering mediation and arbitration services, staging broad-
casted debates between judicial candidates, creating programs to educate
the public, and requiring financial disclosure and contribution limits. 79
To follow up on its Chicago summit, in November 2001 the NCSC held
its "National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment" to "provide fresh analyses of the latest ... constitutional
cases, and unveil cutting-edge reform proposals that could soon be intro-
duced in state legislatures and by state appellate courts around the
country." 80
73 Hudson, supra note 17, at 333.
74 NATIONAL SUMMIT, supra note 1.
75 Id. These leaders were "selected by the chief justices in the seventeen most populous
states with judicial elections." Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. The tension between the need to safeguard the First Amendment amidst judicial




80 Press Release, The National Center for State Courts, Experts to Address Increasingly
Costly and Bitter Judicial Elections: Do Hard Hitting Campaigns Undermine Fair and Impar-
THE END OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORM?
Since the NCSC summit, several states have taken actions that sup-
port the above recommendations. For example, the Administrative
Board of the New York State Court System adopted a resolution in
March 2001 to respond to the summit's "call to action" by establishing
judicial campaign conduct committees, which would address the "sub-
stantial threat to public trust and confidence in the integrity of the judi-
cial system" that the current election system poses. 81 Now called "fair
campaign practice committees," these committees "resolv[e] candidates'
disputes outside the public eye."'82 In addition, in September 2002, the
New York State Bar Association issued a pamphlet entitled "The High
Road-Rules for Conducting a Judicial Campaign in New York" to both
sitting judges and judicial candidates, in an effort to reinforce a "'posi-
tive tone for all judicial elections"' and "'ensure respect for the rule of
law.' "83
The above actions encompass a nationwide movement stemming
from the recognition that, in recent years, the judicial election process
has become increasingly distorted by the influence of special interests,
"big money," and inappropriate campaign conduct. Leaders of this
movement advocate preservation of the function and the integrity of the
judicial branch and the de-politicization of judicial elections. In sum-
mary, the focus of this movement is to make judicial elections more
meaningful, rather than attempting to replace judicial elections altogether
with a system for the appointment of state judges. 84
As part of this movement, concerned parties are reconsidering ex-
isting state ethics codes to determine how these codes can be improved to
better safeguard the credibility of judicial elections. As a result, much
debate has ensued concerning the constitutionality of various types of
judicial ethics code provisions, including provisions that restrict candi-
date speech. This debate has led to court scrutiny of state statutes that
incorporate ethics canons into their codes of conduct. The "pledges and
promises clause" is the least restrictive within this range, in that it is a
tial Courts? (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.ncsconline.orgD-CommIPressRelease/
Symposiumfinal.HTML (last visited Aug. 24., 2003).
81 Resolution of the Administrative Board of the Courts, New York State Office of Court
Administration (Mar. 14, 2001) (photocopy on file with author).
82 Lippman, supra note 38.
83 Press Release, New York State Bar Association, Guidelines Issued for Running a
Clean Judicial Campaign: Local Bar Associations Set to Closely Monitor This Year's Judges'
Races (Sept. 19, 2002) (quoting NYSBA President Lorraine Power Tharp), available at http://
www.nysba.org/template.cfni/template.cfm?template=pressRelease/PressReleaseDisplay.cfm
&PressReleaseDisplay.cfm&PressReleaselD=54 (last visited Aug. 31, 2003).
84 See Lippman, supra note 38; see also NATIONAL SUMMIT, supra note 1. Some legal
commentators advocate the replacement of the judicial election system with a system of judi-
cial appointment. See generally Behrens & Silverman, supra note 2.
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prohibition solely against making formal promises to voters. 85 The
"commit clause" prohibits candidates from "mak[ing] statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, contro-
versies or issues that are likely to come before the court." 86 And finally,
the "announce clause," the broadest of the three, prohibits candidates
from making even vague statements on general public policy issues. 87
While the first two of these provisions are contained within the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the ABA has formally rejected the an-
nounce clause. 88
IV. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
Minnesota's constitution has provided for the selection of states
judges by popular election since 1858, and the state's judicial elections
have been nonpartisan since 1912.89 In 1974, the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct set forth for the first time a canon prohibiting all candi-
dates for judicial office from "announcing" their views on disputed legal
or political issues while campaigning for election.90 Under the Minne-
sota Rules of Board on Judicial Standards, incumbent judges who vio-
lated the prohibition were subject to "removal, censure, civil penalties,
and suspension without pay." 9' This canon, Canon Five, was called the
"announce clause," and was based on Canon 7(B) of the 1972 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 92 The ABA replaced Canon 7(B) with
a different provision in 1992, after First Amendment concerns surround-
ing the canon began to surface.93 The new provision prohibits judicial
candidates from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court."' 94 Though other jurisdictions replaced old ca-
nons with the most recent ABA language, the Minnesota Supreme Court
declined to do so, and instead sustained the announce clause.95
85 See, e.g., MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCIr, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (prohibiting judicial candi-
dates from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impar-
tial performance of the duties of the office").
86 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 5A(3)(d).
87 See Hudson, supra note 17, at 333 ("The announce clause goes beyond the pledges
and promises clause to prohibit judicial candidates from announcing their opinions on matters
of public concern in the legal system.").
88 Id. at 332.
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Gregory Wersal campaigned for the office of Associate Justice of
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1996, during which he circulated litera-
ture disparaging certain past decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
Court.96 The Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, an agency
of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, dismissed
a complaint filed against Wersal based on the announce clause, and indi-
cated skepticism as to whether the announce clause was constitutional. 97
Wersal pulled out of the campaign but decided to run again for the same
office in 1998.98 At this time, Wersal sought an advisory opinion from
the Board, which refused to give him one because he did not specify any
particular "announcements" that he wished to make. 99 He then filed in
District Court against the Lawyers Board and the Minnesota Board on
Judicial Standards (which enforces the ethics rules applicable to judges),
seeking declaratory judgment that the announce clause violated the First
Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement.' l° Wersal as-
serted that, during the 1998 campaign, he had been compelled to refrain
from announcing his views on disputed issues because he feared that he
might violate the announce clause.'0 1 The Minnesota Republican Party
joined Wersal as a plaintiff, alleging that they were unable to learn the
candidate's views and therefore could not support or oppose his candi-
dacy as informed voters.' 0 2 The District Court found for the respon-
dents, upholding the announce clause. 10 3 The United States Court of
Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 10 4 On June
27, 2002, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the announce
clause in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on the grounds that the
clause violated the First Amendment of the Constitution.10 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia considered the meaning and
purpose of the announce clause before undertaking the plaintiffs' First
Amendment concerns.' 0 6 In a five to four decision, the majority deter-
mined that prohibiting a judicial candidate from "announcing his or her
views on disputed legal or political issues" is not the equivalent of
prohibiting a candidate from promising to decide an issue in a certain
way. '0 7 The majority reasoned that the announce clause should be inter-
96 Id. at 768.
97 Id. at 768-69.
98 Id. at 769.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 769-70.




105 Id. at 788.
106 Id. at 770-73.
107 Id.
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preted more broadly than prohibiting pledges and promises because the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct contains a separate "pledges or
promises clause."10 8 The majority next discounted the analyses of the
District Court, the Eighth Circuit, and the Supreme Court of Minnesota
with respect to the announce clause. 10 9 The District Court found that the
clause only extends to disputed issues that could come before the judicial
candidate if elected. 0 The Eighth Circuit built upon the District Court's
reading of the clause, explaining that candidates are in fact entitled to
discuss generally both case law and judicial philosophy."' The Minne-
sota Supreme Court adopted the interpretations of the District Court and
the Eighth Circuit together." 12 The White majority, however, defined the
clause uniquely, concluding that the prohibition bars a candidate from
"stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal question within the
province of the court for which he is running."'1 13 The only exception to
the rule, as Justice Scalia articulated, is that a candidate may discuss such
a legal question in the context of a past decision, unless he has declared
that he is not bound by stare decisis." 1 4 In an attempt to characterize the
announce clause, the majority indicated that the canon is imprecise and
over-inclusive.
Next, the White majority opinion tackled the plaintiff's claim that
the announce clause is inconsistent with the First Amendment.' 5 The
court applied strict scrutiny, the same test applied by the Court of Ap-
peals, to determine whether the clause was unconstitutional." 1 6 Under
this test, the respondents were required to show that the prohibition was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 7 The Court of
Appeals found that the clause served two compelling interests, as shown
by the respondents: (1) preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary
and (2) preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state judici-
ary." 8 While the White majority agreed that both interests are compel-
ling, it concluded that the clause was not narrowly tailored to serve those
interests. 119
To this end, Justice Scalia focused on the concept of impartiality,
exploring three possible meanings of the word in the judicial context.
108 Id. at 770.
109 Id. at 771-73.
110 Id. at 771.
II' Id. at 772.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 773.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 774.
116 Id. at 775-76.
''7 Id.
118 Id.
1'9 Id. at 776-77.
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First, Justice Scalia defined impartiality (in what he deemed to be the
traditional sense) as the equal application of the law by a judge to the
parties who come before him. 120 While acknowledging that an impartial
judiciary, in this sense, is essential to due process, the majority decided
that the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve impartiality
(or the appearance of impartiality) under this definition. 121 The Court
noted that "the clause is barely tailored to serve that interest at all, inas-
much as it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but
rather speech for or against particular issues."' 22 Next, Justice Scalia
described impartiality as a "lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view."' 123 He determined that it is not possible or desira-
ble for a judge to come to the bench without any predispositions and,
moreover, that a judge is not required to do So. 12 4 Finally, Justice Scalia
considered impartiality as "open-mindedness" or the appearance of open-
mindedness.' 25 The respondents argued that the announce clause re-
lieved judges from feeling pressured to rule in a certain way in order to
rule consistently with statements they might have made in the past. 126
The majority dismissed this understanding of impartiality as well. Jus-
tice Scalia explained that judges often state their views on disputed is-
sues outside of campaigns for election, for example, in books they write
or classes they teach. 127 Further, he elaborated, while a candidate in
Minnesota cannot say "'I think it is constitutional for the legislature to
prohibit same-sex marriages[,' . . . [h]e may say the very same thing...
up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say
it repeatedly ... after he is elected."' 12 8 Further, the justice emphasized
that statements made during election campaigns are only a small fraction
of the public's commitment to a particular legal issue that a judge has
undertaken. 129 In other words, there are other reasons why the public
may commit to a particular legal issue that a judge has advocated than
that judge's statements during his election campaign. The majority
found that respondents did not carry their burden, under the Court's strict
scrutiny test, to show that campaign statements are uniquely damaging to
judicial open-mindedness.1 30
120 Id. at 775-77.
121 Id. at 776-77.
122 Id. at 776.
123 Id. at 777.
124 Id. at 777-78.
125 Id. at 778.
126 Id. at 778-79.
127 Id. at 779.
128 Id. at 779-80.
129 Id. at 779.
130 Id. at 781.
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The majority concluded that the clause failed under strict scrutiny,
"both prohibit[ing] speech based on its content and burden[ing] a cate-
gory of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms-speech
about the qualifications of candidates for public office."' 13 1 On those ba-
ses, the court struck down the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judi-
cial conduct, reversed the grant of summary judgment to respondents,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.1 32
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor attributed the alleged
problems associated with the announce clause to Minnesota's initial de-
termination to have popular elections for judges in that state. The justice
perceived "the very practice of electing judges" as being at odds with the
concept of judicial impartiality in the first place, regardless of any state-
ments a candidate may make while campaigning. 33 "Even if judges
were able to suppress their awareness of the potential electoral conse-
quences of their decisions and refrain from acting on it, the public's con-
fidence in the judiciary could be undermined simply by the possibility
that judges would be unable to do so," O'Connor explained.' 34 Justice
Kennedy wrote a concurrence in which he argued that any content-based
restriction of a candidate's speech is flatly prohibited by the First
Amendment. 135
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg wrote separate dissenting opinions,
both of which concentrated on the distinction between judicial elections
and political elections.136 Justice Stevens claimed that the majority made
two mistakes in reaching its decision. First, he criticized the majority for
underestimating the importance of an independent and impartial judiciary
to notions of fairness. 137 Second, the justice asserted that the majority
inappropriately equated the freedom of expression of judicial candidates
with the freedom of expression of other elected officials. 138 Stevens
reasoned:
There is a critical difference between the work of the
judge and the work of other public officials. In a democ-
racy, issues of policy are properly decided by majority
vote; it is the business of legislators and executives to be
popular. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not
131 Id. at 765.
132 Id. at 788.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 789.
135 Id. at 792-96
136 Id. at 797, 803.
137 Id. at 797.
138 Id.
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be determined by popular vote; it is the business of
judges to be indifferent to unpopularity. 139
Justice Stevens sought to shift the focus of whether a judge was
elected or appointed to the importance of safeguarding the unique role
that the judiciary must play in the state. To this end, Justice Stevens
recognized, "[e]lected judges, no less than appointed judges, occupy an
office of trust that is fundamentally different from that occupied by poli-
cymaking officials.... [T]hat they must stand for election ... does not
lessen their duty to respect [the] essential attributes of the judicial of-
fice." 140 Justice Stevens also found fault with Justice Scalia's failure to
distinguish between statements made on the campaign path and state-
ments made in other contexts. The justice argued that the public will
most likely construe statements made during elections as campaign
promises. In sum, Justice Stevens stated:
By obscuring the fundamental distinction between cam-
paigns for the judiciary and the political branches, and
by failing to recognize the difference between statements
made in articles or opinions and those made [while
campaigning], the Court defies any sensible notion of
the judicial office and the importance of impartiality in
that context. 141
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion, articulated principles
similar to those Justice Stevens presented. She professed that "the ratio-
nale underlying unconstrained speech in elections for political office-
that representative government depends on the public's ability to choose
agents who will act at its behest" does not apply in the context of judicial
elections. 142 The justice reasoned that "[l]egislative and executive offi-
cials ... are agents of the people; their primary function is to advance the
interests of their constituencies,"'' 43 while judges "must strive to do what
is legally right, all the more so when the result is not [what] 'the home
crowd' wants."'144 Justice Ginsburg defended the state's right to regulate
judicial elections. On this point, she argued that once a state makes the
threshold decision to elect its judges, the state must be able to establish a
judicial election process. 145 The justice noted that the Court's decision
undermined Minnesota's integrated system of judicial campaign regula-
139 Id. at 798.
140 Id. at 797.
141 Id. at 797.
142 Id. at 806.
143 Id. at 805.
144 Id. at 806.
145 Id. at 805.
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tion. 146 According to Justice Ginsburg, the mere fact that judges are se-
lected by popular vote does not mean that judges should receive the same
treatment under the First Amendment as politicians. 147 Further, the jus-
tice contended that "a litigant is deprived of due process where the judge
who hears his case has a 'direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary'
interest in ruling against him,"' 148 or where the judge is tempted to rule in
any manner other than impartially. 149 Ginsburg also discussed the im-
portance of public confidence in the judiciary and the appearance of the
maintenance of due process.' 50
In addition, Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
the announce clause, explaining that, although the clause forbade a can-
didate to reveal publicly how he would ultimately decide a disputed is-
sue, it did not prevent him from discussing the issue. 15' Instead she
argued that the clause, "[p]roperly construed . . . prohibits only a dis-
crete subcategory of the statements the Court's misinterpretation encom-
passes."' 152 Further, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the pledges and
promises clause would not be able to work if it were not coupled by the
announce clause, because candidates could otherwise easily circumvent
the rule by simply avoiding language associated with pledges and
promises. 153 She explained that "[s]emantic sanitizing of the candidate's
commitment would not... diminish its pernicious effects on actual and
perceived judicial impartiality."' 154 By zeroing in on statements, which
are not technically pledges or promises, but still reveal to the public how
a judge would rule on a legal issue, "the Announce Clause prevents this
end run around the letter and spirit of its companion provision."'
155
V. WHITE ON ITS MERITS
The Supreme Court's decision to strike down the announce clause
makes good sense if Justice Scalia's interpretation of the provision is
accepted at face value. It is certainly possible to understand how a clause
that prohibits a judicial candidate from making general remarks regard-
ing any issue of public policy would raise serious First Amendment con-
cerns. In this respect, Justice Scalia argued that the clause prohibited a
146 Id. at 812.
147 Id. at 821.
148 Id. at 815 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
149 Id. at 815.
150 Id. at 817.
151 Id. at 810-11.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 819.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 820.
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candidate from "stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal ques-
tion within the province of the court for which he is running."'' 56 How-
ever, Justice Scalia's interpretation of the clause did not go unchallenged.
Justice Ginsburg made a compelling argument that the clause did not in
fact broadly prohibit candidates from generally discussing public policy
issues with voters, but, rather, merely forbade candidates to reveal how
they would ultimately decide on disputed legal issues. Ginsburg also
forcefully contended that the announce clause was, in actuality, a com-
panion provision to the "pledges and promises clause" of the Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct, which effectively reduced a candidate's op-
portunity to circumvent the pledges and promises clause through manip-
ulation of semantics. 157 Accordingly, Ginsburg's interpretation of the
clause presents less of an affront to the First Amendment, and would
stand a better chance of passing constitutional muster. However, even if
one supports Justice Scalia's interpretation of the prohibition, as well as
the court's ultimate ruling on it, this note nevertheless takes issue with
the way the majority opinion blurs the important distinction between po-
litical and judicial elections, and ignores the modern realities of judicial
elections.
Justice Scalia's perspective on the nature of judicial elections de-
means the importance of an impartial judiciary as an integral component
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. On this point, Justice
Scalia accuses Ginsburg of "greatly exaggerat[ing] the difference be-
tween judicial and legislative elections."' 158 He also argues that the
"complete separation of the judiciary from ... 'representative govern-
ment ' "1 59 does not make sense where "state-court judges possess the
power to 'make' common law .. . [and] have the immense power to
shape the States' constitutions as well." 160 Essentially, Justice Scalia is
claiming that judges are political actors, which is inconsistent with no-
tions of an effective and inherently neutral judiciary, due process, and the
principle of separation of powers. In this respect, the White majority
pays inadequate attention to the interests of the judiciary, regardless of
the constitutionality of the actual provision at issue. While it is true that
one cannot assume that "anything but the most generic of comments, will
erode the public confidence in an impartial system," it is also vital to
keep the proper balance between the "[t]wo essential elements of a well-
ordered democracy[, ... public confidence in the judicial system and the
right of all citizens to be able to hold and express political opinions.' ' 6'
156 Id. at 773.
157 Id. at 819.
158 Id. at 784.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Cotilla & Veal, supra note 20, at 758.
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In balancing these elements, courts must "question whether certain judi-
cial actions will actually impair or improve the integrity of the judicial
system."162
Further, "[t]he Supreme Court's decision about judicial elections
shows how unrealistic five justices can be about what happens in election
campaigns."'163 In this regard:
Having once taken a position on how those issues ought
to be handled or resolved, a judge cannot be "wholly dis-
interested" in the outcome. Nor can judges free them-
selves from the influence of proclaiming positions to
thousands of voters when an individual case presents an
opportunity to adhere to, or deviate from, that position.
Due process cannot coexist with campaign statements
announcing positions on issues likely to come before the
court. 164
Justice Scalia champions First Amendment rights without recogniz-
ing that free speech within the context of judicial elections, if not care-
fully limited, can make a judge's obligations increasingly difficult to
fulfill once elected to office. 165
VI. WHITE'S REACH: GAINING PERSPECTIVE
Though the ultimate effect of White is still unclear, the Supreme
Court's decision was a setback to notions of judicial election reform. In
this regard, the White decision reflects the limitation of state authority to
monitor judicial elections. White is dangerous in that the decision opens
the door to further court-imposed or other obstacles to the state's author-
ity to regulate judicial elections. However, White is technically only a
decision on the "announce clause," and does not equate to the end of
state reform in the context of judicial elections. 166 In fact, there has been
significant backlash to the decision already. 67 The White mandate
162 Id.
163 Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, 39 CT. REv. 8 (2002),
available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
164 Brennan Center Brief, supra note 9, at 21.
165 Ironically enough, "[w]here once it was the liberals on the Supreme Court who could
be counted on to be consistent champions of the First Amendment, it is now the conservative
justices who are often the most protective of free speech." Erwin Chemerinsky, Judicial Elec-
tions and the First Amendment, 38 TRIAL 78 (2002).
166 See Memorandum, Brennan Center for Justice, Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White: What Does the Decision Mean for the Future of State Judicial Elections? (2002), at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/prog-ht-kelly-memo.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2003).
167 Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Top Legal Organizations Express Concern
About Impact of Supreme Court's White Decision on Fair and Impartial Courts (Jun. 27,
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leaves ample room to reverse the trend towards politicization, and to
make elections of states judges more meaningful. Such reform would
help to revitalize the fair and open-minded operation of the state courts
and the judicial branch.
Beyond the merits of the decision itself, the White ruling must be
understood for what it did and what it did not do. First, White struck
down the announce clause. The announce clause was broader than the
ABA's "commit clause,"'168 which the Minnesota Supreme Court refused
to adopt. In other words, even though the "announce clause" was for-
mally abandoned by the ABA after numerous concerns had arisen, the
Minnesota court continued to use the 1972 version of the canon.' 69 The
White majority invalidated only the announce clause, which was argua-
bly too ambitious, but in any event more ambitious than the ABA canon
and similar canons adopted by other states. Further, the announce clause
was only in effect in nine states, out of thirty-nine states that have some
sort of judicial elections: Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. 170 Second,
White settled a circuit split.171 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Buckley
v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,172 held that the clause extended to lim-
iting judges from announcing even general propositions, such as "I am a
strict constructionist," and that the clause therefore violated the First
Amendment. 173 However, in Stretton v. Disciplinary Board, 174 the Third
Circuit held that "[i]f judicial candidates during a campaign prejudge
cases that later come before them, the concept of impartial justice be-
comes a mockery."' 175
While it is true that thirty-nine states have canons limiting what can-
didates may say in campaigns, it is important to understand that the deci-
sion was not a victory over the regulation of judicial campaign elections.
The ABA canon and other state canons based on the ABA canon remain
intact. The state's authority to regulate judicial elections suffered a real
blow in June 2002, but it was not abolished. States have historically
implemented measures to preserve the unique role of the judiciary in
2002), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases-2002/pressrelease-
20021120.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Top Legal Organizations].
168 See Jan Witold Baron, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican Party of Minne-
sota v. White, 39 CT. REV. 12, 14 (2002), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
169 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 771, 773 n.5 (2002).
170 Hudson, supra note 17, at 333.
171 Id.
172 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
173 Hudson, supra note 17, at 333.
174 944 F.2d 137 (3rd Cir. 1991).
175 Id. at 142.
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judicial elections, and continue to hold that power. 176 In fact, the Court
emphasized that it was "'not saying judicial elections have to sound just
like other elections.' "177 Thus, there is still considerable room for regu-
lation of judicial elections. Universal reaction to the White decision ap-
pears to recognize the survival of the state's power to regulate judicial
elections, as well:
White clearly underscores the applicability of the First
Amendment to regulation of campaign speech. But the
decision also declines to hold that judicial campaigns
may not be subject to regulation, and it leaves alone
most of the judicial campaign rules currently in the ca-
nons. New analysis of these canons in light of the deci-
sion is entirely appropriate. Pell-mell revision of the
canons on the media-driven assumption that the Court
has held them invalid is unwarranted. 78
Some have predicted, however, that even though "[tihe White Deci-
sion will lead many state supreme courts (and other bodies responsible
for oversight of judicial election campaigns) to re-examine their canons
of campaign conduct,"' 79 it will also "no doubt embolden the critics of
those canons to bring more constitutional challenges." 180
VII. THE AFTERMATH
A. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT- WEAVER V. BONNER
Though the sting of White is not as severe as it initially appears to
be, the courts seem to be in a state of confusion in terms of sorting out
what exactly amounts to legitimate constitutional regulation of campaign
conduct. The Eleventh Circuit's October 2002 decision in Weaver v.
Bonner'8 succeeded White as the next strike against judicial impartiality
and judicial election reform. In Weaver, the court found that the provi-
sion in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judicial candi-
dates from "personally soliciting campaign contributions . . . but
allow[ing] the candidate's election committee to engage in these activi-
ties"' 182 was not narrowly tailored to serve Georgia's interest in judicial
176 Chief Justices' Brief, supra note 66, at 5-9.
177 Marcia Coyle, New Suits Foreseen on Judicial Elections, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 8, 2002, at
Al, A9 (quoting Deborah Goldberg, Deputy Director of the Brennan Center for Justice).
178 Statement, National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial Election Law, Republi-
can Party of Minnesota v. White and the Canons Regulating Judicial Elections 4 (July 12,
2002), available at http//:www.judicialcampaigncond.PDF.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
182 Id. at 1322.
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impartiality and, therefore, violated the First Amendment. 183 The court
also found unconstitutionally vague the provision prohibiting a judicial
candidate from:
using or participating "in the use of any form of public
communication which the candidate knows or reasona-
bly should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, decep-
tive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of
fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the commu-
nication considered as a whole not materially misleading
or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation
about results the candidate can achieve."' 184
These provisions are closely modeled after the ABA's Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, and the Weaver opinion itself practically quotes Jus-
tice Scalia's language from White.185 The court "agree[d] that the dis-
tinction between judicial elections and other types of elections has been
greatly exaggerated," and stated that it "d[id] not believe that the distinc-
tion, if there truly is one, justifies greater restrictions on speech during
judicial campaigns than during other types of campaigns." 186 The brief of
amicus curiae submitted by the Conference of Chief Justices in support
of the appellees, however, argues that judicial campaigns across the
country will be adversely affected by the Panel's decision, and more spe-
cifically it "will make judicial elections ... more corrupting for candi-
dates, more coercive for supporters, and more corrosive for public
confidence."' 187 Personal soliciting by judges creates "an inherent . . .
advantage for a judge-candidate and undue pressure on the person solic-
ited-so often a lawyer."' 188 The brief maintains that "requiring the
soliciting to be conducted by the candidate's committee is a key part of
the Code of Judicial Conduct to assure that 'judges shall not lend the
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the
judge.' "189 The association between campaign contribution limits and
limits on free speech has been made in the past, some arguing that be-
cause unique restrictions are placed upon judicial candidates in this re-
gard, unique requirements can constitutionally be placed on speech. 190
183 Id.
184 Commission Petitions for Re-hearing of Campaign Holding, WKLY. JUD. ETHICS
NEWS, Nov. 13, 2002, at http://www.ajs.org/ethics/story.asp?content-id=77.
185 309 F.3d at 1321.
186 Id.
187 Chief Justices Brief, supra note 66, at 3, Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir.
2002) (No. 00-15158), available at http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/decisions/
WeaverCJAmicus.PDF (last visited Sep. 11, 2003).
188 Id. at 5.
189 Id. (quoting MODEL CODE Canon 2B).
190 Hudson, supra note 17, at 333.
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Though the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue involved in
Weaver, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion presents a challenge to the state's
authority to monitor judicial election.
B. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT-IN RE KINSEY
In January 2003, the Florida Supreme Court held in In Re Kinsey' 9 1
that a judicial canon, barring judicial candidates from making statements
that appear to commit the candidate with regard to issues or cases, does
not violate the right to free speech. 192 Kinsey therefore affirmed the le-
gitimacy of the "commit clause" of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct.
The commit clause is narrower than the announce clause and is based
upon the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The Florida Code includes
both a "commit clause" and a "pledges and promises" clause. 193 Addi-
tionally, the commentary to the clauses in the state's code explains that
"a candidate should emphasize in any public statement the candidate's
duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her personal views."' 194 The
court found that Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii) was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest-maintaining the integrity of the judiciary and
the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary. 195 The court reasoned:
A judicial candidate should not be encouraged to believe
that the candidate can be elected to office by promising
to act in a partisan manner by favoring a discrete group
or class of citizens. Likewise, it would be inconsistent
with our system of government if a judicial candidate
could campaign on a platform that he or she would auto-
matically give more credence to the testimony of certain
witnesses or rule in a predetermined manner in a case
which was heading to court. 196
Thus, the court concluded that the restrictions do not unduly pro-
hibit speech.197 The court also made clear that, even though a candidate
can state his views on disputed issues, in order to "ensure that the voters
191 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003).
192 Id. at 88-89.
193 The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A candidate for a judicial office ... shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impar-
tial performance of the duties of the office; [or]
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court. ...
FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii) (2003).
194 Id. at Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)(ii) cmt.
195 Kinsey, 842 So.2d at 87.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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understand a judge's duty to uphold the constitution and laws of the state
where the law differs from his or her personal belief, the commentary
encourages candidates to stress that as judges, they will uphold the
law."198 The decision represents a step away from White, and a confir-
mation that state provisions restricting judicial campaign conduct are val-
uable, as well as constitutional.
C. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK-
SPARGO
Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct' 99
serves as the companion case to Kinsey, and was clearly decided with
much deference to the Supreme Court's holding in White.200 On Febru-
ary 20, 2003, the Spargo court declared facially unconstitutional all New
York Code of Judicial Conduct provisions aimed at forbidding political
activities of candidates campaigning for judicial election.20' The court's
decision, however, likely has much to do with the fact that New York
State elections are partisan elections, whereas elections in many other
states are nonpartisan.
The court reasoned that the New York Code provisions were even
broader than the announce clause at issue in White, concluding that the
provisions precluded judges from "participating in politics at all except
to participate in their own election campaigns. ' 20 2 The court determined
that "a wholesale prohibition on participating in political activity for fear
of influencing a judge ignores the fact that a judicial candidate must have
at one time participated in politics or would not find him or herself in the
position of a candidate. '20 3 In addition, the court contended that if a
judge were actually influenced or biased against a party for political rea-
sons, the proper course of action would be recusal. 204
Again, the Spargo opinion focuses on the partisan nature of New
York State judicial elections, and does not speak to the constitutionality
of similar provisions in states holding non-partisan elections. Hypotheti-
cally then, even if the Supreme Court were to validate Spargo, the force
of ethics provisions with respect to nonpartisan elections would remain
untouched. Spargo, in this respect, invites legal commentators support-
ing the preservation of judicial elections to consider whether replacing
partisan judicial elections with nonpartisan elections would resolve the
198 Id.
199 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (2003), stay pending appeal denied, No. 1:02 Civ. 1320 (N.D.N.Y.
2003).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 92.
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constitutional concerns associated with ethics code prohibitions on candi-
date speech and provide an adequate means by which to restore the integ-
rity of judicial elections. Eliminating partisan elections, however, will
not prevent politics from influencing the judicial selection system. Non-
partisan elections with active special interest group participation can be-
come just as "politicized" as partisan elections. In other words, partisan
elections are not the problem, as strong political forces influence both
partisan and non-partisan modern elections. Instead, the solution is to
strengthen state controls on the judicial selection system as a whole, in-
cluding state ethics codes.
The Spargo opinion, modeled after White, has been met with much
criticism in New York State, and has incited backlash in support of the
state's ethics restrictions associated with judicial campaigns.20 5 New
York State judges were told by the Office of Court Administration to
continue to follow the state's ethics rules, despite Spargo, until the Sec-
ond Circuit has heard and formally ruled on the Spargo appeal. 206 New
York Courts have thus continued to censure judicial misconduct.20 7 The
New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its commitment to enforcing the
state's judicial ethics provisions in In re Raab20 8 and In re Watson.2°9 In
these cases, the court made clear that is not bound by the Northern Dis-
trict Court's decision in Spargo by holding that active judges cannot en-
gage in partisan politics, and that judicial candidates cannot make
campaign promises to voters that interfere with the fair and impartial
administration of justice.21 0
205 See John Caher, Former State Bar President Warns of Risks to Judicial Independence
in Recent Cases, N.Y. L.J., June 9, 2003, at 1; John Caher, Judicial Conduct Commission
Under Fire: State Watchdog Group Fights a Multi-Front Battle to Maintain Provisions of
Ethics Code, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 2003, at 1; see also John Caher, Bar Groups File Briefs in
'Spargo' Case: Associations Say Federal Judge Erred In Striking State's Judicial Conduct
Code, N.Y. L.J., June 23, 2003, at 1; John Caher, Judicial Conduct Commission Fires Back
After 'Spargo': Stern Affidavit Cites Adverse Impact of Federal Court Ruling, N.Y. L.J., April
1, 2003, at 1; John Caher, New State Bar Leader Plans An Aggressive Agenda, N.Y. L.J., June
16, 2003, at 1; John Caher, State Limits on Judicial Speech Survive Constitutional Scrutiny:
Restrictions on Campaign Statements Help Assure Judges Are Free of Bias, N.Y. L.J., June
11, 2003, at I.
206 See John Caher, OCA to Judges: Keep Following Stricken Rules, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24,
2003, at 1; Owen Moritz, Nix Politics, Judges Told, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2003, at 29;
207 Petitioner's Misconduct Warrants Censure: No. 78-Matter of Honorable William
Watson, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2003, at 19; Court Accepts Sanction of Censure: No. 91-Matter
of the Honorable Ira J. Raab, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2003, at 21; John Caher, Panel Declares It is
Not Bound by 'Spargo' Case: Mason Removed From Bench Despite Federal Ruling, N.Y. L.J.,
May 2, 2003, at 1; John Caher, State Limits on Judicial Speech Survive Constitutional Scru-
tiny: Restrictions on Campaign Statements Help Assure Judges Are Free of Bias, N.Y. L.J.,
June 11, 2003, at 1.
208 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003).
209 794 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2003).
210 See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 1; Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1287. One of the main arguments
that the Second Circuit will hear on the appeal of Spargo, is that the federal court should not
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Upon examining Weaver, Kinsey, and Spargo, as well as the cases
reacting to Spargo, it is clear that the courts are sending out mixed sig-
nals as far as what the White decision says about the constitutionality of
individual state ethics codes.2 1' A clearer picture will only emerge as
these cases continue to move through the appeals process.
VIII. CONTINUING REFORM
Since the Supreme Court announced its decision, various prominent
national legal organizations have spoken out against White, and have
jumped to the task of restoring the sanctity of judicial elections and safe-
guarding the functioning of impartial courts. In this respect, White has
been the true "call to action." In late 2001, the Justice at Stake Cam-
paign, a nationwide coalition of legal and citizen organizations dedicated
to the protecting independence of the judiciary, conducted a series of
surveys, which were administered to both judges and randomly selected
members of the public. 212 Results of the surveys indicated that the pub-
lic perceives contemporary judges as political (but considers them "a
special kind of politician") 213 and believes that judicial elections have
become "nastier" than ever.214 In response to the White decision, the
executive director of the Justice at Stake Campaign stated that "'[m]ore
candidates will be pressured to resort to politics as usual to become
judges.'" 21 5 In addition, Justice at Stake campaign participant and ABA
President, Robert E. Hirshon, stated that "'[White] is a bad decision ...
[that] will open a Pandora's box,' "216 and, consequently, "'[w]e will
now have judicial candidates running for office by announcing their posi-
tions on particular issues, knowing that voters will evaluate their per-
formance in office on how closely their rulings comport with those
have handled the Spargo case before it was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals,
particularly in light of Raab and Watson. In other words, though the District Court Judge in
Spargo determined that there was no right to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals on the
constitutional issue presented, the Raab and Watson decisions cast doubt on the strength of the
Spargo decision.
211 See John Caher, 'Spargo' Decision Leaves Confusion in its Wake: Scope of Judges
Activity in Elections Remains Unsettled, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 2003, at 1; see also Adam Liptak,
Judges Mix with Politics: A New Federal Ruling Breaks Down a Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2003, at BI; James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Ruling Allows Judges to Take Part in Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at B1; Politicians in Judges' Robes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at A24.
212 David B. Rottman, The White Decision in the Court of Opinion: Views of Judges and
the General Public, 39 CT. REV. 16 (2002), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
213 Id. at 18-19.
214 Id. at 17.
215 Top Legal Organizations, supra note 167 (quoting Geri Palast, Executive Director of
Justice at Stake Campaign).
216 Id.
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positions.' "217 The ABA is reviewing the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct, on which almost all state codes are based, to ensure that its related
canons can survive the White decision. 2 18 The ABA has also appointed
ethics experts to contemplate the effect of White on the Model Code. 219
Finally, the Law Alumni Association and The Brennan Center for Justice
at the New York University School of Law sponsored a symposium enti-
tled "Dangerous Times for the Least Dangerous Branch? Judicial Cam-
paigns and Judicial Independence after White" in order to facilitate
discussion concerning the potentially detrimental impact of the White de-
cision on judicial elections. 220 Clearly, reform efforts, in the aftermath
of White, have not stopped.
CONCLUSION
White set in motion a series of evaluations as to the constitutionality
of particular ethics code prohibitions, and individual states must now
cope with that reality. In the aftermath of the White decision, the courts
are trying to determine what form judicial elections should take in the
future. The very viability of a free and independent judiciary is at stake.
The issues considered in Weaver, Kinsey, and Spargo will undoubtedly
reach the Supreme Court, whereupon the constitutionality of prohibitions
other than the announce clause will be scrutinized. The potential for
needed reform of the election system in the future thus will be deter-
mined by the outcome of the court decisions that will follow, as well as
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